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I. Introduction 
A firm in financial distress may be forced to change its capital structure and redesign its 
business in order to avoid default. Business restructuring may involve asset sales, 
business divestitures, plant closings, management turnover, and employment reductions. 
Some of these changes are simply meant to raise cash and repay creditors, but many 
others do not have a major impact on the firm's current revenues and primarily affect its 
future profitability. 
These last changes may be the by-product of debt restructuring. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explained, l there is a fundamental conflict of interest between the 
firm's owners and its creditors --- the formers preferring riskier investment projects. 
The shareholders' risk appetite is increasing in the debt-equity ratio. Since a debt 
restructuring usually results in a lower debt-equity ratio, it may induce the firm to 
restructure its business. In addition, to the extent that financial distress may shift 
bargaining power from shareholders to creditors, the latter may successfully impose 
various operational changes as preconditions to restructure their claims. 
In sum, the agency theory of debt developed by Jensen and Meckling suggests 
that for firms in financial distress a debt restructuring should lead to changes in 
production and, in particular, in their input allocation decisions. But, to what extent does 
the evidence validate this prediction? 
In this paper, we address this question by examining the employment decisions 
of Spanish manufacturing firms in financial distress. A reduction in employment may 
lower the firm's costs in the short term, allowing the firm to repay some of its current 
debts. But most importantly, a change in employment affects the firm's production 
function and, consequently, its future profitability. Under highly plausible assumptions 
(see section In), a fall in employment will reduce profit volatility. Therefore, according 
to the agency theory of debt, we should expect to find a significant relationship between 
debt restructuring and employment cuts other things equal. 
Indeed, we find that firms restructuring their debt in response to distress are 
more likely to reduce their employment. Employment falls as the firm's debt exposure 
is reduced, but also as a consequence of a bank debt restructuring involving exclusively 
an extension of maturity. The first effect is consistent with the prediction that a lower 
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debt-equity ratio should induce the firm to choose less risky projects. The second effect 
may simply indicate a change in the bargaining powers of shareholders and creditors, 
which is due to financial distress. Therefore, our paper provides a positive (albeit 
indirect) test of the agency theory of debt. 
It seems logical to focus on firms experiencing sudden shocks leading to 
financial distress in order to test this theory. Sudden financial distress produces a severe 
disruption that may force the firm to reconsider both its capital structure and its business 
strategy. This allows us, as external observers to firms, to examine the causal 
relationship between these two types of decisions. This is particularly important since, 
as in many other existing studies, we use data from balance sheets. The capital structure 
reported in a firm's balance sheet is the result of a series of decisions over time, which 
may bear no relationship with the firm's current decisions. 
In our analysis, we choose to focus on the employment decisions of firms, rather 
than on their other input choices. In particular, we will not analyze asset sales, which are 
certainly important operational actions often associated to financial distress. This is 
because a primary objective of asset sales is to raise cash to repay creditors and thus 
avoid any real restructuring.2 Nonetheless, we will control for asset sales in our 
employment regressions to account for reductions in employment that are caused by 
these sales and are not due to debt restructuring. 
Our sample of Spanish firms is particularly well suited for the purposes of this 
analysis. Our sample is selected from a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms 
constructed by the Bank of Spain. This is a rich database,3 which is used by the Bank of 
Spain to monitor the impact of macroeconomic policy and credit conditions on Spanish 
non-financial firms. These firms have simple capital structures, often involving private 
debt (mainly bank debt) and equity only, which makes it relatively easy to model and 
investigate the use and abuse of debt.4 Also, they have simple ownership structures: 
most of these firms are controlled by large shareholders, typically by families, so that 
I See also Fama and Miller (1972), Merton (1977) and Myers (1977) among others. 
2 Of course, layoffs reduce the total wage bill of the firm. But also revenues may be negatively affected 
and severance compensations may have to be paid. Thus, the net effect of an employment reduction on 
the firm's current cash flow is a priori undetermined. In any case, as we shall see in section IV.E, there is 
a statistically significant direct relationship between layoffs and debt restructuring. This is not true when 
we consider the relationship between asset sales and debt restructuring. CA formal test of this last result 
can be obtained from the authors upon request.) 
3 In 1994, this database comprised firms representing 21.6 % of the total value added by the non-financial 
sector in Spain, and 21 % of the labor force in this sector. 
4 The median firm in our sample has only bank debt and trade credit among its liabilities (see Panel A of 
Table 1). 
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ownership and control remain largely in the same hands. Finally, they operate in a labor 
market with high firing costs and unionized bargaining at the macroeconomic level (i.e. 
not responsive to specific firm's conditions) where, therefore, layoffs constitute non-
trivial decisions, even for firms in financial distress. 
In Spain, most financially distressed firms restructure through private workouts 
with creditors. The Spanish bankruptcy restructuring code (Ley de Suspension de 
Pagos), which shares the pro-debtor bias of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, is 
highly inefficient: both firms with positive going concern value and their creditors try 
by all means to avoid formal bankruptcy. Indeed, few firms file for bankruptcy and the 
vast majority of those who enter formal bankruptcy are eventually liquidated, with 
creditors recovering a very small fraction of their claims. Creditors, including banks, are 
allowed to hold equity in firms, whether in financial distress or not. Yet, in practice, 
they do not often take equity in exchange for debt. 5 Most debt restructurings consist of a 
redefinition of the existing debt contracts, involving both debt reductions and extensions 
in maturity. Spanish firms find it easier to renegotiate with banks than with public 
debtholders. Renegotiating the terms and conditions of public debt requires, according 
with the Spanish corporation law (Ley de Sociedades Anonimas), a majority vote among 
bondholders and, consequently, it is both costly and subject to potential free-rider 
problems. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related empirical 
literature. Section III presents our testable hypothesis. In section IV, we define the main 
variables of interest, describe how the sample of firms is selected and report the main 
features of the data. Section V contains the econometric analysis and presents our main 
empirical results. In section V.A, we present logit regressions of the probability that a 
firm in financial distress cuts its employment in a non-marginal way. We relate this 
probability to various real and financial characteristics of firms and, in particular, we 
focus on the effect on employment of debt reductions and of extensions in the maturity 
of debt. In these regressions, we control for both asset sales, which are shown to 
increase the probability of layoffs, and wage concessions, which in contrast reduce the 
likelihood of employment cuts. To the extent that the various operational and financial 
responses to financial distress are simultaneously determined, we conduct in section 
5 Out of the 930 financially distress firms in our sample, in only 28 firms banks held an equity stake in the 
year previous to distress, and in only 7 firms banks increased their equity stakes during the year of 
distress. 
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V.B several tests (which involve the estimation of a series of multinomiallogit models) 
to show that our results also hold true when the potential endogeneity of our main 
explanatory variables is explicitly taken into account. In section VI, we investigate the 
implications on firm operating performance of employment reductions following 
financial distress. Section VII concludes. 
11. Related empirical literature 
Our paper is related to the extensive literature that has analyzed the financial and 
operational actions undertaken by firms in financial distress. For instance, John, Lang 
and Netter (1992) show that distressed firms often react by quickly reducing their labor 
force and, more generally, their unit labor costs. They also cut R&D expenditure, 
increase investment and reduce their leverage. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) also 
document substantial layoffs (almost 2/3 of the work force) as part of the restructuring 
of the D.S. steel industry during the 1980's (a period of severe distress for the steel 
industry). Finally, Denis and Kruse (1998) find for a sample of D.S. Compustat firms 
that "approximately two-thirds of the firms either restructure their assets, layoff 
employees, or initiate major cost-cutting efforts." 
Much of this literature has examined the relation between the firm's response to 
financial distress and its capital structure. Ofek (1993) finds that a firm's leverage has a 
positively and significant effect on the probability that some operational action will be 
taken in response to distress. Also, Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein's (1994) main 
finding is that the firm's capital structure influences the actions taken by financially 
distressed firms in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
Focusing on employment, Ofek (1993) finds that highly leveraged firms are 
more likely to layoff a substantial part of their labor force as well as restructure their 
debt. Also, Hanka (1998) finds a positive relationship between debt and employment 
reductions, and Sharpe (1994) reports a statistically and economically significant 
relationship between a firm's leverage and the cyclicality of its work force. Opler and 
Titman (1994) also show a relation between a firm's capital structure and employment 
responses to economic decline. More concretely, they find that employment growth is 
slower for highly leveraged firms and that leverage has a significantly stronger effect on 
employment during downturns. Finally, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find that Japanese 
firms also layoff a substantial part of their work force in response to performance 
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declines. Yet, layoffs in Japan result in a smaller change in employment at the firm level 
than do layoffs in the U.S. (roughly speaking employment reductions amount to 5 % of 
the firm's workforce for their sample of Japanese firms whereas the corresponding 
figure for their sample ofU.S. firms is 15 %). 
Kang and Shivdasani (1997) also investigate the determinants of layoffs In 
Japanese firms experiencing a performance decline. Unlike Ofek (1993), Sharpe (1994) 
and Hanka (1998), they no find no significant relationship between layoffs and the 
firm's capital structure. Layoffs are more likely for large firms, who perform poorly and 
are controlled either by a main bank or a large blockholder. 
We also find that a large proportion of Spanish firms in financial distress layoff 
a substantial part of their workforce. Furthermore, like Kang and Shivdasani (1997), we 
find no significant relationship between layoffs and debt. However, our paper differs 
from the previous literature in that we focus on the interplay between financial 
restructuring and employment reductions. We find that layoffs are significantly related 
to debt restructuring, i.e. to changes in the firm's capital structure. Of course, our 
analysis requires controlling for the firm's capital structure prior to distress, as well as 
to account for potential endogeneity problems, but this is not our main emphasis. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we base the relation between financial 
restructuring and operational restructuring (layoffs) on the agency theory of debt that 
stresses the importance of shareholder-bondholder conflicts. In this respect, our paper 
provides a clear-cut quantitative illustration of the agency costs of debt arising from 
these conflicts of interest. Here, again, we are not the first to investigate the empirical 
validity of this theory. For instance, Kim and Maksimovic (1990) restate the agency 
problem of debt to derive testable implications concerning the effect of debt on the 
firm's input decisions. Consistently with this theory, they find that high levels of debt 
are associated with inefficient investment in capacity and an inadequate input mix. 
Agency problems have also been quantitatively analyzed using a contingent-claims 
approach (e.g. Brennan and Schwartz, 1984; Mello and Parsons, 1992; Leland, 1988) 
and, more recently, through numerical simulations (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999). 
Yet, these last papers are only indirectly related to ours. We follow a different 
empirical strategy that centers on the link between financial and operational adjustments 
undertaken by firms in financial distress. If there is a shareholder-bondholder conflict of 
interest, then the theory predicts a positive interrelationship between these two kinds of 
restructuring. We find such relation between debt restructuring and employment 
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reductions for our sample and, therefore, provide a quantitative illustration of the often 
alleged importance of such conflicts. 6 
Ill. Debt restructuring and employment 
A firm is in financial distress if its cash flows are not sufficiently large to meet its 
current obligations.7 Financial distress may involve financial restructuring between the 
firm, its creditors and shareholders, as well as operational actions, such as asset sales, 
plant closings and employment cuts. Some operational changes are aimed to raise cash 
and pay trade credits and interest expenses. But some others do not have a major impact 
on the firm's current revenues and mainly affect the firm's future revenue stream. These 
last changes may be closely linked to financial restructuring. 
The different pay-off structures of debt and equity lead to a conflict of interest 
between the firm's owners and its creditors (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The firm's 
shareholders prefer projects involving higher risk, since they fully enjoy the project's 
upside potential and are usually protected against its downside. Its creditors, instead, 
prefer lower risk projects because they are limited on the upside and are fully exposed 
to the downside. 
This conflict of interest may play a fundamental role in the resolution of 
financial distress when the distressed firm must change its capital structure to avoid 
default. In those circumstances, creditors may successfully demand that the debt-
restructuring package involve a redefinition of the firm's operational characteristics for 
the post-distress period. On one hand, financial distress heightens creditors' incentives 
to interfere with the firm's operations since it makes bankruptcy more likely. In 
addition, financial distress raises the bargaining power of incumbent creditors vis-a-vis 
shareholders. Incumbent creditors acquire useful information about the firm's activities 
and prospects over time. Therefore, they are a cheaper source of funds than any other 
less informed outside investor is. If distress is severe, incumbent creditors may 
constitute the only source of external finance, thus making them pivotal for the firm's 
survival. 
6 In this last respect, our paper is also related to Brown, lames and Mooradian (1994), who investigate the 
role of creditor pressure in the sale of the assets. 
7 This defmition is close to the definitions in Wruck (1990) and Ross, Westerfield and laffe (1996). 
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A. A simple model 8 
When do creditors prefer less employment than shareholders do? To answer this 
question, suppose that the firm operates a production technology that yields X(N) units 
of output when N workers are employed. Let X'(N) > 0 and X"(N) < 0 for all N. That 
is, production exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Suppose, in addition, that the firm 
sells its output in a competitive product market at an uncertain price p > 0, which is 
distributed according with a distribution function F(p).9 Workers are hired from a 
perfectly competitive labor market, where they can earn a reservation wage r > O. If 
employed by the firm, they are paid a wage w > 0 in non-default states and have priority 
over all other claim-holders in case of default. 10 Furthermore, the firm has debt with 
face value B. Hence, firm's profits are given by pX(N) - wN - B, so that the variance of 
profits is equal to X(N)2 Var(p). That is, projects involving more employment are 
naturally riskier in this simple setting. 
Under these assumptions, we have that shareholders' choose employment Ns the 
solution of: 
E{pX'(N) I p > Ps(N)} = 8(w(N)N)/8N (1) 
and 
weN) [1 - F(Pe(N))] + E{pX(N)/N I p < PeeN)} F(Pe(N)) = r, (2) 
where E{.} denotes the expectations operator, Ps(N) = (w(N)N + B)IX(N) and PeeN) = 
(w(N)N)IX(N). The LHS of equation (1) is the average marginal revenue from 
increasing employment N, where the average is taken across non-default states, i.e. for p 
> Ps(N). The RHS is the marginal increase in totallabor costs when raising N. Equation 
(2) implicitly defines the firm's wage profile ws(N). Given that wage claims are 
assumed senior to any other claim, workers are paid ws(N) whenever the firm's 
revenues exceed its wage bill (which occurs with probability [1 - F(Pe(N))]) and, 
otherwise, they are the residual claimants to the firm's revenues. Competition among 
8 This is a variant of the well-known Jensen and Meckling (1976) model, and it is also related to Gertner 
and Scharfstein (1991) and Padilla and Requejo (1999). 
9 For technical reasons, we restrict attention to the set of distribution functions for which the second-order 
conditions of the maximization problems below are satisfied. A distribution function satisfying the 
required property is the uniform distribution, as it can be shown from the authors upon request. 
10 Indeed, in Spain, wages are senior to any other claim to the firm. They are said to enjoy a "super-
privilege." 
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homogeneous workers ensures that in equilibrium ws(N) is such that the expected 
payoff from employment is equal to the reservation wage, r.11 In equilibrium, the firm's 
wage is equal to Ws = ws(Ns). 
From equations (1) and (2), it follows that: 
Proposition 1. 8Nsl8B > O. 
Proposition 1 is a variant of the "excessive risk taking" problem associated with 
limited liability (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Because of limited liability, 
shareholders take only into account non-default states (i.e. price realizations p > Ps(N)) 
in order to compute the average value of the marginal product of labor. As B increases, 
the threshold Ps(N) increases for all N, which implies that, for given N, the average 
marginal product of labor for shareholders raises with B, whereas its marginal cost 
remains unchanged. 
If creditors were in charge of employment, they would choose employment Ne 
the solution of: 
E{pX'(N) I PeeN) < p < Ps(N)} = 8(w(N)N)/8N (3) 
and 
weN) [1 - F(Pe(N))] + E{pX(N)/N I p < PeeN)} F(Pe(N)) = r. (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) have the same interpretation than equations (1) and (2). Equation 
(4) defines the firm's wage profile in this case, which we denote by we(N). The firm's 
equilibrium wage is now equal to Wc = we(Ne). 
From equations (2) and (4), it follows that we(N) == ws(N) == weN) > r for all N, 
and that weN) is strictly increasing in N. As N increases, the probability of being paid 
the contractual wage falls (i.e. [1 - F(Pe(N))] is decreasing in N). Workers, anticipating 
this, demand a higher wage. Therefore, the RHS of equations (1) and (3) are identical 
for all N: i.e. the marginal cost of labor is equal in both scenarios. However, we have 
that for all N: 
E{pX'(N) I PeeN) < P < Ps(N)} < E{pX'(N) I p > Ps(N)}. (5) 
That is, the marginal return to increasing N for creditors is lower than the marginal 
return of employment for shareholders. This is because creditors only take into account 
11 Propositions 1 and 2 below are proved in Appendix. 
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price realizations for which the value of labor productivity, pX'(N), is lower, i.e. p E 
[PeeN), Ps(N)]. Hence, combining equations (1) to (5), we have that: 
Proposition 2. (a) Ns> Ne and (b) Ws== weNs) > w(Ne) == We. 
Creditors choose less employment than shareholders do, because their income is 
fixed at B for high price realizations, when employment is highly valuable, while it is a 
function of N when its marginal productivity is worth less. Creditors' cautious policy 
regarding employment implies a lower probability of default and, consequently, lower 
wages in equilibrium. 
B. Testable hypothesis 
Propositions 1 and 2 gIve nse to our mam testable hypothesis, namely that debt 
restructuring leads to employment reductions for firms in financial distress. Insofar as a 
debt restructuring involves a reduction in the firm's total debt exposure, Proposition 1 
tells us that it should lead to significant employment reductions. In addition, as we 
argued above, creditors may only accept to restructure their claims if managers are 
willing to run the firm in a way that conforms better to creditors' preferences. Within 
the context of our formal model, Proposition 2 suggests that such a shift in preferences 
would result in less employment and lower wages. 
Therefore, our hypothesis would be validated for our sample of Spanish firms if 
substantial employment cuts were found to be positively and significantly related to 
both debt reductions and extensions in maturity. In fact, an extension in the maturity of 
debt, even when it involves no change in the face value of debt, may effectively 
constitute a debt reduction from the viewpoint of shareholders, at least as long as they 
discount the future. If discounting is moderate, though, a positive relationship between 
employment cuts and extensions in debt maturity would indicate a change in the firm's 
objective function. 
Our simple model assumes wage flexibility. In our setting, this implies that 
wages fall when employment falls. Consequently, the reduction in employment 
resulting from a debt restructuring will be partly compensated by a reduction in the cost 
of labor. If, instead, wages did not adjust to employment, the reductions in employment 
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caused by a debt restructuring would be even larger. It is, therefore, important to control 
for labor market characteristics that proxy for wage flexibility, as well as to account for 
the existence of negotiated wage reductions, when testing our hypothesis. 
The following sections are devoted to testing our hypothesis. 
IV. Variables, sample selection, and data description 
A. Main Variables 
Our definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio, consistently 
with Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and other related papers. A firm's interest 
coverage ratio is equal to the ratio of its earnings before interests, taxes and 
amortization (EBITA) to its reported interest expenses. In any given year, a firm is 
classified as financially distressed if this ratio decreases significantly. That is, if it falls 
from a value larger than or equal to 2 to a value smaller than or equal to 1. We denote as 
t = 0 the pre-distress period, when the firm's interest coverage ratio is larger than 2. t = 
1 is the period of financial distress, i.e. the period when the coverage ratio falls below 1, 
and t = 2 denotes the post-distress period. 12 This selection procedure identifies those 
firms that run into financial problems unexpectedly, as opposed to those other firms that 
get distressed after a long-lasting period of decline. Sudden financial distress may force 
the firm to restructure financially and also to undertake various operational actions. This 
simultaneous reorganization of the firm's financial and production structure will allow 
us to test the hypothesis discussed in the previous section. 
Regarding the employment decisions of firms, we will distinguish between firms 
that layoff 10 percent or more of their labor force and firms that either increase 
employment or do not cut it by as much. Therefore, we will construct a dummy 
variable, LAYOFFS, that takes a value of 1 if the firm cuts its labor force by 10 % or 
more, and 0 otherwise. This is consistent with the previous literature (see, for example, 
Ofek, 1993) and it is done in order to make sure that these employment reductions 
12 This defmition of financial distress is related, but not identical to the definitions used by Ofek (1993) 
and Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994). Ofek considers that a firm is in financial distress if its 
market value from t = 0 to t = 1 decreases significantly. We cannot refer to this measure since a large part 
of our sample comprises unquoted firms, and data on market capitalization for quoted firms is not 
available. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein employ a coverage ratio similar to ours, but they focus only 
on firms with severe liquidity problems. 
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constitute non-marginal responses to financial distress, rather than marginal adjustments 
to a changing environment. 
A debt restructuring involves a reduction in debt payments and/or an extension 
of maturity. To capture a reduction in total debt payments we use two different dummy 
variables. The first dummy, TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION, takes the value of 1 if the 
ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets falls from t = 0 to t 
= 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable, BANK DEBT REDUCTION, 
takes the value of 1 if the book value of bank debt decreases from t = 0 to t = 1, and it is 
o otherwise. We will say that a firm's debt maturity is extended when there is a 
simultaneous reduction in the firm's short-term debt and an increase in its long-term 
debt. As standard, debt due in a year or less is termed as short-term debt, while debt 
with longer maturity is defined as long-term debt. In our empirical analysis below, we 
will only consider extensions of maturity involving bank debt. 13 For this purpose, we 
construct a dummy variable, BANK DEBT EXTENSION, which is equal to 1 when the 
firm's bank debt maturity is extended. 
Arguably, firms that sell part of their assets are more prone to reduce 
employment. In order to control for this effect, we introduce a dummy variable, ASSET 
SALES, that is equal to 1 if the firm is reducing its gross fixed assets by 10 % or more 
from t = 0 to t = 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The reason for this discretization is identical to 
that used in defining the variable LAYOFFS. Finally, because wage concessions may be 
a substitute for layoffs from the viewpoint of the distressed firm and its financial 
creditors, we define a dummy variable, WAGE CONCESSIONS, that equals 1 if the 
ratio of labor costs to employment falls in the distress period and it is 0, otherwise. 14 
B. Sample selection 
The sample has been set up using a database provided by the Bank of Spain that 
contains the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of 7,846 Spanish firms for the 
13 Indeed, we find no relationship whatsoever between employment and extending the maturity of public 
debt. This may be due to the small number of firms that extend the maturity of public debt in our sample: 
out of 930 financially distressed firms, only 21 firms extend the maturity of public debt, whereas 98 
firms extend the maturity of their bank debt, 270 firms reduce the total public debt and 361 firms reduce 
their bank debt. 
14 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) argue that wage concessions are easier to achieve if the firm lays off a 
substantial part of its workforce. That is, layoffs cause wage concessions. Our results below are 
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period 1983-1994. This database also reports infonnation on employment for all these 
finns. For each finn in the sample, there is complete infonnation for at least four 
consecutive years. Finns in this database are not selected by random sampling 
procedures, but they voluntarily report their infonnation to the Bank of Spain. The 
sample includes mainly large manufacturing corporations (enjoying limited liability). 
Medium- and small-sized finns, as well as non-manufacturing firms, are misrepresented 
in the sample. IS 
We do not incorporate utilities or state-owned finns in the sample. The sample 
does not include finns that were taken over or finns that divested part of their lines of 
business during the sampling period. Also, firms that changed their lines of business 
from one sector to another are excluded from the analysis. Their inclusion in the final 
sample would make it more difficult to interpret our results, because they may operate 
drastically different technologies over time. In order to explain the effect of debt 
restructuring on layoffs, finns with no interest expenses are also excluded from the 
sample. 
Due to these exclusions and other purely technical data constraints, we construct 
an intennediate sample of 4,566 finns from which to select the final sample of 
financially distressed finns. Most observations in this intennediate sample belong to the 
period 1987-1990, to the sectors "Food, beverage and tobacco" and "Automobile: spare 
parts and maintenance". The resulting final sample consists of930 observations offinns 
in financial distress. A subset of this sample, 120 observations, corresponds to 60 firms 
that were found twice as financially distressed during the reference period. (We only 
allow a finn to be classified twice as financially distressed if it remains in the sample at 
least 8 years. This is done to eliminate those finns with a very unstable pattern of 
earnings.) Most distressed observations belong to the 1989-1993 period and to the 
sector "Automobile: spare parts and maintenance". 
C. Data description 
Panel A in Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main characteristics of our 
intennediate sample of 4,566 Spanish firms. We split the sample into two groups. The 
inconsistent with this interpretation and point out to a relation of substitutability between these two 
events. 
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first group includes 930 financially distressed firms whereas the second includes 3636 
non-distressed firms. Then, we present and compare the sample means and the sample 
medians of the reported variables for each of the two groups described. To ensure that 
the results reflect pervasive phenomena rather than scattered outliers, all variables used 
in this study are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1 % tails. That is, values outside 
the 1 st or 99th percentile are set equal to the 1 st or 99th percentile. All nominal variables 
are denoted in Spanish currency (Ptas), and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price 
Index. 
We include three kinds of variables in this Panel: 
(a) Real variables, such as total sales, total assets, employment, the ratio of temporary 
workers in the labor pOOl,16 the unit labor costs, the capital-labor ratio, and the 
changes in gross fixed assets and employment from the pre-distress period; 
(b) The interest coverage ratio for the pre-distress, distress and post-distress periods; 
and, finally, 
(c) Financial variables, such as the total debt over total assets ratio - including and 
excluding trade credit -, the total bank debt to total debt ratio (excluding trade 
credit), the ratios of interest expenses to total assets and interest expenses to total 
debt (excluding trade credit), the current assets to current liabilities ratio (or 
liquidity ratio), and the change of this last ratio from the pre-distress period. 
From this Panel we can reach the following conclusions. The median firm in 
financial distress appears to be smaller than its non-distressed counterpart. In fact, the 
medians of both total sales and total assets are significantly smaller for distressed firms. 
Yet, the means of sales and assets are statistically equal for both groups of firms. So, 
size comparisons must be taken with caution. 
Instead, the mean and median of the proportion of temporary workers for 
financially distressed firms is significantly smaller than for firms that do not experience 
financial distress. In addition, unit labor costs are also significantly higher for 
financially distressed firms. 
Comparing the mean and median of the capital-labor ratio of the two groups of 
firms, we see that this ratio is significantly lower for financially distressed firms at t = O. 
IS For further description of the original database, see "Resultados Anuales de las Empresas No 
Financieras", Banco de Espafia (Central de Balances), 1994. 
16 In European labor markets, temporary workers are those hired for a fixed time period and not entitled to 
severance payments. 
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Interestingly, the gross fixed assets of the median firm experiencing financial distress 
fall from t = 0 to t = 1, whereas this is not the case for other firms. 
The median firm, whether or not in financial distress, does not change 
employment. On average, both kinds of firms increase their labor force, but financially 
distressed firms do so to a lesser extent. 
The median of the interest coverage ratio at t = 0 is significantly higher for 
financially distressed firms. (The comparison using means has the same sign but it is not 
statistically significant.) Even though, our selection procedure implies that firms in the 
distressed pool have an interest coverage ratio of 2 or more at t = 0, it is still remarkable 
that this ratio is significantly larger for firms in financial distress than for non-distressed 
firms. This suggests that firms selected as distressed were not under performing prior to 
distress and, consequently, that our selection procedure successfully singles out those 
firms that run into financial problems unexpectedly. 
There are significant differences between the capital structure of financially 
distressed firms and non-distressed firms. Distressed firms are less leveraged but have 
an approximately equal proportion of bank debt over total debt exposure (excluding 
trade credit). Regarding the cost of capital, the evidence presented in Panel A of Table 1 
is mixed. Both the mean and median of the interest expenses to total assets ratio are 
significantly smaller for financially distressed firms. In contrast, the comparison of the 
interest expenses to total debt (excluding trade credit) ratio for both kinds of firms is 
ambiguous. The mean of this last ratio is significantly larger for distressed firms, but the 
median is significantly smaller. 
Finally, the liquidity ratio at t = 0 is significantly larger for firms experiencing 
financial distress. Again, this indicates that financial distress occurred suddenly and 
unexpectedly. Also, this ratio experiences a reduction from t = 0 to t = 1 for the sub 
sample of financially distressed firms. 
To summarize, Panel A of Table 1 shows that financially distressed firms were 
performing quite well prior to distress, but experienced a substantial performance 
decline from t = 0 and t = 1. They were somewhat smaller than their non-distressed 
counterparts, were relatively more labor intensive, and possessed a less flexible and 
more costly labor force. Finally, they were less leveraged than non-distressed firms. 
In Panel B of Table 1, we describe how the firms in our final sample reacted to 
financial distress. A substantial proportion restructures debt: 32 % experienced a 
reduction in their total debt exposure, 39 % a reduction in bank debt, and 11 % an 
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extension in the maturity of bank debt. Regarding operational actions, we have that 11 
% sold 10 % or more of their assets, 47 % negotiated wage cuts, and 21 % reduced 
employment by 10 % or more. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1997) analyze the operational responses to performance 
declines for a sample of Japanese firms and a sample of V.S. firms. They find that for 
their sample Japanese firms experiencing financial distress: 4 % sell assets, 17 % reduce 
employment, and 5.4 % negotiate pay cuts. Likewise, they find that for their sample of 
V.S. firms: 36.8 % sell assets, 31.6 % reduce their workforce, and 6.1 % negotiate pay 
cuts. Comparing these results to those in Panel B of Table 1 is complicated because of 
the various differences in the definition of variables. Yet, two conclusions emerge. First, 
Spanish firms' operational responses to distress are similar to those of their Japanese 
and V.S. counterparts. Second, concerning employment, Spanish firms appear to be less 
prone to cut employment than U.S. firms, but more than Japanese firms. This may 
simply reflect the different degrees of flexibility of their respective labor markets. 
D. Sources of financial distress 
As pointed out by Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), firms may expenence 
financial distress for three different reasons: (i) a high interest expense, (ii) a poor 
operating performance relative to other companies in the industry, and (iii) an industry 
downturn. In order to assess the relative importance of these factors in causing financial 
distress, we make the following calculations: 
1) Leverage effect: the increase in cash flow (defined as EBIT A less interest expense) 
at t = 1 had the firm the same ratio of interest expense to total assets as the median 
firm in its sector. 
2) Firm operating performance effect: the increase in cash flow at t = 1 had the firm 
the same ratio of EBIT A to total assets as the median firm in its sector. 
3) Industry operating performance effect: the increase in cash flow at t = 1 had the firm 
the same ratio of EBITA to total assets relative to its sector, but the sector did as 
well as it did at t = O. 
To evaluate the relative importance of each factor for a given firm, we divide its 
cash flow change attributable to each factor by its total cash flow change. Table 2 shows 
that the firm operating performance factor is the most important one in causing financial 
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distress: poor firm operating performance is the first cause of distress for 886 firms (out 
of 930 financially distressed firms) and accounts for 96.12 % of the shortfall in firms' 
cash flows. The other two factors are much less important: leverage is the primary cause 
of distress for 42 firms and poor industry performance is the first cause of distress for 
only 2 firms in our sample. Thus, our sample of financially distressed firms mainly 
suffers from economic distress and only 42 firms are in financial distress for exclusively 
financial reasons. 17 
This is consistent with the descriptive results in Panel A of Table 1, showing that 
financially distressed firms are less indebted and at a lower cost than non-distressed 
firms. Firms experiencing financial distress in our sample are labor intensive, pay high 
wages and face large firing costs. Consequently, there are greatly exposed to economic 
problems, such as a decline in the demand for their products. 
E. Contingency analysis 
Before we undertake a multivariate analysis of the employment implications of debt 
restructuring for our sample of financially distressed firms, we conduct a series of 
contingency analyses to better understand the statistical relationship between layoffs 
and the other main variables of interest (described in section IV.A.). That is, we test 
whether the proportion of firms that layoff 10 percent or more of their labor force 
increases or decreases as a result of financial distress, or when distressed firms 
restructure their debt, or sell part of their assets, or negotiate wage concessions. This 
preliminary statistical analysis will guide us in the formulation and interpretation of the 
multivariate regression models described in the next section. 
Table 3 presents the results of our contingency analyses. In Panel A, we report 
the contingency table for LAYOFFS and financial distress, where it can be observed 
that the proportion of firms cutting employment (i.e. firms for which the variable 
LA YOFFS takes a value of 1) is significantly larger for firms in distress than for non-
distressed firms. These percentages are 21.40 % and 14.03 %, respectively. Thus, the 
evidence seems to confirm our claim that financial distress may trigger substantial 
reductions in employment. 
17 These results are in line with obtained by Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), who also find that 
their sample financially distressed firms "suffered principally from economic distress." 
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In Panel B, we present three contingency tables to study the statistical 
relationship between the variable LAYOFFS and our three dummies for debt 
restructuring: TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION, BANK DEBT REDUCTION and BANK 
DEBT EXTENSION. We find that there is a statistically significant association between 
LA YOFSS and both TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION and BANK DEBT REDUCTION. 
That is, the proportion of firms cutting employment by 10 % or more is significantly 
larger at firms whose debt is reduced from t = 0 to t = 1. This is not the case if we, 
instead, relate LAYOFFS with the variable BANK DEBT EXTENSION. Yet, if we 
look at Panel C, we observe that an extension in the maturity of bank debt leads to a 
significantly larger proportion of firms firing 10 % or more of their labor force, when 
we condition on the sub-sample of firms that experience a reduction in their total debt. 
This, however, is not true if instead we condition on the sub-sample of firms that reduce 
their bank debt or on firms whose total debt exposure is not reduced. 
Finally, Panel D shows two contingency tables relating the variable LAYOFFS 
with our dummies ASSET SALES and WAGE CONCESSIONS. We find that the 
proportion of firms reducing employment by 10 % or more is significantly larger for 
firms whose gross fixed assets fall by 10 % or more (i.e. the dummy ASSET SALES 
takes a value of 1). It seems, therefore, that there is some complementarity between 
employment reductions and asset sales. l8 But, as we saw in the previous panels, assets 
sales are not the only variable with a significant relationship to layoffs. 
In contrast, the proportion of firms reducing employment by 10 % or more is 
significantly smaller for firms that negotiate a reduction in its unit labor costs (i.e. the 
dummy WAGE CONCESSIONS takes a value of 1). Wage concessions appear to be a 
substitute for employment reductions from the viewpoint of firms in distress. 
v. Regression analysis 
A. Univariate logit regressions 
Table 4 presents logit regressions (with robust standard errors) of the probability that a 
firm in financial distress cuts its employment by 10 % or more (LA YOFFS) on our 
18 Kang and Shivdasani (1997) also report a positive relationship between layoffs and asset sales for their 
sample of Japanese firms. 
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main explanatory variables: the three proxies for debt restructuring (TOTAL DEBT 
REDUCTION, BANK DEBT REDUCTION and BANK DEBT EXTENSION), the 
dummy ASSET SALES, and the dummy WAGE CONCESSIONS. In these regressions, 
we introduce various real and financial controls, as well as a time and sector control. 
These regressions are conducted on our final sample of 930 financially distressed firms. 
In Columns I and 2 of Table 4, we just introduce our main explanatory variables 
as regressors. But since the variables TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION and BANK DEBT 
REDUCTION are highly correlated, we introduce them separately in Columns 1 and 2 
respectively. The results confirm the contingency analysis developed in the previous 
section. Employment cuts of 10 % or more are (significantly) more likely for distressed 
firms selling assets and for firms that do not obtain wage concessions from their 
workers. Most importantly, we find that the three debt restructuring dummies (TOTAL 
DEBT REDUCTION, BANK DEBT REDUCTION and BANK DEBT EXTENSION) 
have a positive and highly significant effect on the probability of substantial reductions 
in employment. 
In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the analysis of the previous two equations, but we 
include two additional variables controlling for the firms' capital structure (as proxied 
by the total debt to total assets ratio), and the cost of capital (measured by the ratio of 
interest expenses to total debt) at t = O. The results for our main explanatory variables 
remain unchanged. In addition, we observe that the probability of a non-marginal 
employment reduction is significantly larger, the larger is the cost of capital. However, 
it appears that more leveraged firms do not necessarily adjust employment more. (These 
results are unchanged when we introduce these two controls separately. They also 
remain unchanged when we replace the total debt to total assets ratio with alternative 
measures of firm's leverage, such as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets, the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt.) 19 
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 present the results of logit regressions like those in the 
previous columns but including other (real) controls, such as the proportion of 
temporary workers in the labor force, the capital-Iabor ratio, the log of total assets, and 
the return on assets at t = O. In addition, we include the control variable SECTOR AND 
19 These results are in sharp contrast to Ofek's (1993). He finds a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between a firm's leverage and the probability of substantial layoffs. Other papers finding a 
positive relation between leverage and employment at the firm level are Sharpe (I 994),and Hanka (1998), 
to cite just a few. In contrast, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) do not find any relationship between layoffs 
and leverage for a sample of Japanese firms experiencing performance declines. 
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TIME which, for each observation, is equal to the percentage of firms reducing 
employment by 10 % or more in the same year and the same sector. This percentage is 
calculated using our intermediate sample, which comprises both financially distressed 
and non-distressed firms. 
Introducing these new controls does not affect the sign and significance of the 
variables included in previous columns. Thus, the evidence presented so far 
qualitatively validates the predictions of the agency costs theory described in section Ill. 
To evaluate the quantitative importance of the impact of the debt restructuring 
dummies on employment and, consequently, of the agency costs of debt, we present in 
Panel A of Table 5 the changes in the odd ratios associated with a shift from 0 to 1 in 
the value of each of these dummies. This is a standard measure that is, by construction, 
invariant to the values taken by the remaining controls. The odd ratio is defined as the 
ratio of the probability of an employment reduction involving 10 % or more of the labor 
force (that is, Pr{LA YOFFS = 1}) to its complement probability (Pr{LA YOFFS = O}). 
The numbers reported in Panel A of Table 5 are equal to the odd ratio when the 
corresponding dummy takes the value of 1 divided by the odd ratio when it is o. All 
these numbers exceed 1, which simply reflects that all debt-restructuring dummies have 
a positive impact on the likelihood of employment reductions. Furthermore, we observe 
that bank debt extensions appear to have a quantitatively more important impact on the 
employment decisions of distressed firms than debt reductions. Finally, the changes in 
the odd ratios associated with changes in the debt restructuring dummies can be 
compared with the change in the odd ratio between firms in financial distress and non-
distressed firms. From Panel A in Table 3, we have that this last ratio is equal to 1.67. 
Thus, the impact on employment of our debt restructuring variables is, at least, of a 
similar order of magnitude than the impact of financial distress. 
An alternative way of quantifying the impact of a debt restructuring on 
employment is to consider how the estimated probability of substantial layoffs changes 
in response to our debt restructuring proxies for the median firm in our sample of 
financially distressed firms (see Panel A of Table 1). This is reported in Panel B of 
Table 5. There, we observe that the probability of reducing employment by 10 % or 
more for the median firm when it is not involved in a debt restructuring is 
approximately 20%. This probability raises up to 26% if there is a bank debt reduction, 
31 % if the firm experiences a total debt reduction and to more than 31 % if there is a 
bank debt extension. Thus, the impact on employment of a debt restructuring appears to 
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be quite large. Also, in line with our previous results using odd ratios, bank debt 
extensions have a larger effect on employment than debt reductions do. 
Focusing on the new control variables introduced in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, 
we have that the probability of substantial reductions in employment following financial 
distress is significantly larger for firms with a higher proportion of temporary workers. 
Of course, this is because in Spain temporary workers are not entitled to severance 
payments. These payments, which are necessarily incurred when firing fixed-term 
employees, are very high (in fact they rank among the highest for OECD countries). A 
larger proportion of temporary workers thus implies a more "flexible" labor force. 
Size also affects the probability of reducing employment in response to financial 
distress: it has a significantly negative effect.2o In Columns 5 and 6, size is measured by 
the log oftotal assets. In an unreported regression, we have replaced the log of net fixed 
assets (or tangible assets) for the log of assets. The result remains unchanged: an 
increase in tangible assets has a significant negative impact on the probability of 
layoffs. This last result admits an alternative interpretation, however. Tangible assets are 
by and large collateralizable. Therefore, a firm with more tangible assets is a better risk 
from the point of view of its creditors, who may accept to restructure their claims in 
exchange of collateral without conditioning on operational actions such as layoffs. 
We also control for performance, measured by the return on assets (ROA). As it 
could be expected, substantial layoffs are more likely for firms who perform relatively 
worse, even within the subset of distressed firms. Similar results are obtained if we use 
an alternative measure of operating performance: the ratio of EBIT A to total assets. 21 
Furthermore, Columns 5 and 6 control for time and sector. This control IS 
statistically significant and, hence, it is important to take it into account. We replicated 
all regressions in Table 4 including both time dummies and sector dummies. The sign 
and significance of the variables in Table 4 remain unchanged. We also run our 
regressions with some regressors expressed as the deviation from the industry median 
for that year. 22 Again, nothing of substance changes. 
20 This contrasts with the results of Ofek (1993) and Kang and Shivdasani (1997), where size is found to 
be positively correlated with the incidence of layoffs. This relation is significant for the Japanese firms 
studied by Kang and Shivdasani (1997), but not significant for the D.S. sample of firms considered by 
Ofek. 
21 Kand and Shivdasani (1997) obtain similar results. Ofek (1993) also finds a negative relationship 
between layoffs and performance, but it is not statistically significant. 
22 This transformation is done for all regressors, except the dummy variables for which it would not be 
meaningful. 
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For all regressions in Table 4, we calculated the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-
of-fit test. The test shows that the regressions in the first two columns do not adjust very 
well to the data. In contrast, the test is met satisfactorily for the regressions reported in 
Columns 3 to 6, where we control for the real and financial characteristics of firms. That 
is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the models in Columns 3 to 6 described the 
data appropriately. 
B. Endogeneity problems 
A potential problem with the regressions in Table 4 is that the dummy variables 
TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION, BANK DEBT REDUCTION, BANK DEBT 
EXTENSION, ASSET SALES, and WAGE CONCESSIONS may all be endogenous. 
For example, the theoretical analysis in section III indicates that both employment and 
wages are endogenously determined. If employment was hard to adjust because of, for 
instance, high firing costs, then the distressed firm would be compelled to negotiate 
wage reductions or else go bankrupt. A similar problem may arise with the other 
explanatory dummy variables. In this subsection, we show that, although these 
endogeneity problems constitute a legitimate concern, they have no bearing on our 
empirical results. 
We tackle the possible endogeneity of WAGE CONCESSIONS by substituting 
the ratio of labor costs to employment at t = 0 for this dummy. Indeed, these two 
variables have a significantly positive correlation. Not surprisingly, as we can see from 
Table 6, the ratio of labor costs to employment at t = 0 has a significantly negative 
impact on the probability of layoffs. This is the same qualitative impact than WAGE 
CONCESSIONS had. Furthermore, and most importantly, all our other results remain 
unchanged. 
Unfortunately, coping with the potential endogeneity of the remaining dummy 
variables is not so simple. ASSET SALES are not correlated with the log of assets at t = 
0, and there is no other variable in our data set that a priori may constitute a good proxy 
for it. Similarly, it is unclear how one could meaningfully proxy the debt restructuring 
dummies with lagged variables of the firm's capital structure. Consequently, we will 
adopt the following econometric strategy. 
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First, we estimate a bivariate logit for the joint probability of LAYOFFS and 
TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION for a sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no 
asset sales and enjoying no bank debt extension. Obviously, estimating the joint 
probability takes care of the possible endogeneity of the two events: LA YOFFS and 
TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION. Furthermore, by focusing on this sub-sample we can 
successfully control for ASSET SALES and BANK DEBT EXTENSION. The bivariate 
logit is estimated as a multinomiallogit model (see Amemiya, 1985), using the same 
external controls as in Table 6. 
This estimation strategy allows us to calculate, for firms in this sub-sample, both 
the conditional probability of an employment reduction of 10 % or more given that the 
firm experiences a total debt reduction, and the corresponding conditional probability 
when the firm's total debt is not reduced. This comparison tells us what is the impact of 
a total debt reduction on the employment decisions of firms in distress, once possible 
endogeneity problems are controlled for. 
From Panel A in Table 7, we have that the conditional probability of an 
employment reduction of 10 % or more given that the firm experiences a total debt 
reduction is equal to 25 %, whereas the corresponding conditional probability when the 
firm's total debt is not reduced is just 16 %. The difference between these two 
probabilities is significant at the 1 % level. 
Similarly, we estimate a bivariate logit for the joint probability of LAYOFFS 
and BANK DEBT REDUCTION for a sub-sample of financially distressed firms with 
no asset sales and undergoing no bank debt extension. We then calculate the conditional 
probability of an employment reduction of 10 % or more given that the firm experiences 
a bank debt reduction, which is equal to 23 %, and the corresponding conditional 
probability when the firm's bank debt is not reduced, which equals 15 %. (See Panel B 
in Table 7.) This difference is also significant at the 1 % level. Thus, the effect of a bank 
debt reduction on the employment decisions of firms in distress, even when controlling 
for endogeneity, remains large. 
Finally, we repeat the same procedure to evaluate the impact of a bank debt 
extension on employment for financially distressed firms. The only difference is that, in 
this case, to estimate the joint probability of LAYOFFS and BANK DEBT 
EXTENSION, we condition on the sub-sample of distressed firms with no assets sales 
and experiencing no debt reductions. From Panel C in Table 7, we have that the 
conditional probability of an employment reduction of 10 % or more given that the firm 
23 
experiences a bank debt extension is equal to 16 %, whereas the corresponding 
conditional probability when the maturity of the firm's bank debt is not extended is just 
13%. The difference between these two probabilities is again significant at the 1 % level. 
So, bank debt extensions have a large and significant effect on the employment 
decisions of firms in distress, even controlling for endogeneity. Yet, in contrast with the 
univariate regression analysis above, its quantitative impact is less than that of debt 
reductions. 
VI. The impact of layoffs on operating performance 
So far, we have found evidence of a relationship between debt restructuring and layoffs 
for firms in financial distress. A related question is the extent to which layoffs and debt 
restructuring actions improve operating performance for firms experiencing financial 
problems. In what follows, we address this question by analyzing the change (from t = 1 
to t = 2 and from t = 1 to t = 3) in three measures of operating performance: return on 
assets (ROA), the interest coverage ratio (i.e. the ratio of EBITA to interest expense), 
and the ratio of EBITA to total assets. More precisely, for each distressed firm we 
calculate each of these measures at t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3 relative to the corresponding 
value for the median firm in its sector in that year. Then, we use these calculations to 
evaluate the change in operating performance relative to sector and time. 
As a benchmark for comparison we take the average change in these measures 
for the group of distressed firms that do not adjust employment significantly. We, then, 
compare this benchmark to the average change in the operating performance measures 
for the subset of distressed firms that (a) cut employment, (b) cut employment and 
reduce their total debt, ( c) reduce employment and their bank debt, and finally, (d) 
reduce employment and extend the maturity of bank debt. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 8. First, we observe that there is a 
(relative) improvement in operating performance for our financially distressed firms. 
This is true irrespective of how we measure performance and of the precise actions 
undertaken in response to financial distress. These changes may appear to be very large 
in size, but one should keep in mind that the firms in our sample experienced declines in 
their interest coverage ratio of more than 100 % from t = 0 to t = 1. Indeed, in an 
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unreported Table, we find that while these firms perform better than the industry median 
in periods t = -1 and t = 0, they do worse than the industry in periods 1, 2 and 3. 
Most importantly, as a general rule, there does not appear to be any significant 
difference in operating performance between firms that do not adjust employment and 
firms that cut employment substantially and/or restructure financially. The only 
exception to this statement can be found in Column 3 of Panel A and Columns 2 and 3 
of Panel B. In Column 3 of Panel A, we have that distressed firms that cut employment 
and reduce bank debt exhibit superior performance with respect to the benchmark group 
when we restrict attention to the interest coverage ratio and the ratio of EBIT A to total 
assets. A similar result is obtained in Column 3 of Panel B when, instead, we focus on 
ROA and the interest coverage ratio. Finally, in Column 2 of Panel B, we observe that 
distressed firms cutting employment and experiencing a total debt reduction perform 
better than those that do not adjust employment when using the interest coverage ratio. 
Notice that employment cuts are only associated to superior performance for firms that 
see their (bank or total) debt reduced.23 24 
A. Interpreting the evidence 
Under the assumptions of the simple model developed in section Ill, the optimal 
employment level N* is such that E{pX'(N*)} = 8(w(N*)N*)/8N, where w(N*) is 
determined using equation (2) above. Therefore, efficient hiring requires equalizing the 
marginal cost of increased employment to its (unconditional) average marginal revenue. 
It is immediate from this last equation and equations (1) and (3) above that Ne < N* < 
Ns. That is, relative to the first-best level, shareholders tend to hire in excess, whereas 
creditors employ too few workers. Furthermore, it is easy to see that as the face value of 
debt B falls, shareholders' employment choice Ns converges to the optimal employment 
level N*. 
Hence, the model predicts that a debt restructuring that consists of a significant 
reduction in the debt-equity ratio would lead to improved performance, at least insofar 
23 The results on operating performance in Table 8 remain largely unchanged even if we correct for 
normal mean reversion in operating performance measures (see Barber and Lyon, 1996, and Denis and 
Kruse, 1998). 
24 The international evidence on the impact of layoffs on operating performance is mixed. Denis and 
Kruse (1998) find no significant effect of employment reduction on stock prices for their sample of US 
Compustat firms. In contrast, for a sample of Japanese firms in distress, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find 
that layoffs lead to improved performance. 
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as shareholders retained control of the employment decisions. However, if creditors 
successfully imposed their preferences on employment by conditioning the debt 
restructuring on operational actions, we might switch from over-employment to under-
employment with no clear-cut prediction on performance. 
In conclusion, using the model in section Ill, we could interpret the evidence on 
the evolution of operating performance as suggesting that the employment reductions 
undertaken by our sample of distressed firms could have been imposed by creditors as 
part of the restructuring deal. Under this interpretation, the changes in the level of 
employment might simply reflect a change in the preferences under which employment 
is decided and not a move towards greater efficiency. Further research is needed to 
discriminate between this theory and other alternative explanations, but this exceeds the 
scope of this paper. 
VII. Conclusion 
We have presented clear-cut evidence that debt restructuring triggers substantial 
employment reductions in financially distressed firms. Employment falls as the firm's 
debt exposure is reduced, but also as a result of extensions in the maturity of debt. The 
first effect is consistent with the prediction of the agency theory of debt that a lower 
debt-equity ratio should lead to the choice of less risky projects. The second effect is 
also consistent with this theory and it may reflect the change in the bargaining power of 
shareholders and creditors resulting from financial distress. 
These empirical results are derived for a sample of 4,566 Spanish manufacturing 
firms for the period 1983-1994. This sample is set up using a database provided by the 
Bank of Spain containing the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of 7,846 
Spanish firms for this period. This is a rich database, which is used by the bank of Spain 
to monitor the impact of macroeconomic policy and of credit conditions on the Spanish 
non-financial sector. Our sample is well suited for the purposes of our analysis. These 
firms have simple capital structures, often involving only bank debt and equity, which 
makes it simple to analyze the agency costs of debt. In these firms, ownership and 
control rests in the same hands. In addition, they hire from a highly rigid labor market, 
where adjustments in employment represent non-trivial decisions, even for firms in 
financial distress. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Given that we restricted attention to F(.) functions for which 
second-order conditions are satisfied, and since 8(ws(N)N)/8N is independent of B, it is 
enough to show that: 
8E{pX'(N) I p> Ps(N)}/8B = 
-(8ps(N)/8B) [Ps(N)X'(N) - 8(ws(N)N)/8N]f(Ps(N)) > 0, 
which follows since, for all N, we have that: 
(i) 8ps(N)/8B > 0, 
(ii) [Ps(N)X'(N) - 8(ws(N)N)/8N] < 0, and 
(iii) f(p) = 8F(P)/8p > 0, for all p. 
Proof of Proposition 2: First, since we(N) == ws(N) == weN), we have that 8(ws(N)N)/8N 
== 8(we(N)N)/8N. Hence, it follows from the inequality in (5) that 
E{pX'(Ns) I PeeNs) < P < Ps(Ns)} < 8(we(Ns)Ns)/8N. 
Given our restrictions on the set of feasible distribution functions, it follows that Ne < 
Ns. Then, from equations (2) and (4) it is immediate that Ws== weNs) > w(Ne) == wc. 
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Table 1 
Data description 
This sample has been set up using a database provided by the Bank of Spain. We exclude from the sample utilities, state-owned firms, 
firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, firms that changed their lines of business from one sector 
to another or firms with no interest expenses. The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBIT Alinterest 
expenses). EBITA denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We denote as t = 0 the pre-distress period; t = 1 is the period 
of financial distress; t = 2 denotes the post-distress period. All variables are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1 % tails. All 
nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in millions of Pesetas), and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Panel A 
Summary statistics for a sample of 4,566 Spanish firms (1983-1994) 
Test Test 
Mean of Median of 
Means b Medians C 
Financial No financial p-value Financial No financial p-value distress distress distress distress 
Real Variables 
Total sales (t=O) 2,711.15 2,666.47 0.83 643.50 799.00 0.00 
Total assets (t=O) 2,621.1 1 2,375.25 0.28 493.00 576.00 0.00 
Employment (t=O) 166.12 158.72 0.54 45.50 51.00 O. I I 
Temporary workerslEmployment (t=O) 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 O.oI 
Labor costs/ Employment (t=O) 2.45 2.34 0.00 2.28 2.18 0.00 
Net Fixed assets/Employment (t=O) 3.07 3.43 0.04 1.39 1.73 0.00 
Change in employment from t=O to t=1 (%) 0.12 2.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Change in gross fixed assets from t=O to t=1 (%) 4.89 7.07 0.02 -2.12 0.06 0.00 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
EBIT A/Interest expenses (t=O) 6.27 6.19 0.82 3.25 2.70 0.00 
EBIT AlInterest expenses (t= I) -0.43 6.60 0.00 0.03 2.89 0.00 
EBIT A/Interest expenses (t=2) 2.04 6.68 0.00 1.24 2.87 0.00 
Financial Variables 
Total debt" /Total assets" (t=O) 0.30 0.39 0.00 0.28 0.39 0.00 
Total debt/Total assets (t=O) 0.53 0.60 0.00 0.53 0.62 0.00 
Total bank debt/Total debt" (t=O) 0.82 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Interest expenses/ Total assets (t=O) 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 
Interest expenses/ Total debt" (t=O) 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.05 
Liquidity ratio (t=O) 1.85 1.55 0.00 1.50 1.30 0.00 
Change in liquidity ratio from t=0 to t=1 (%) -4.93 7.15 0.00 -10.25 2.16 0.00 
Number of observations 930 33,372 930 33,372 
Notes: 
"Trade credit not included. 
bt-test for significant differences of the means of the distressed and non-distressed groups of firms. 
Ctest forthe hypothesis that both independent samples (distressed firms and non-distressed firms) are from populations with the same 
distribution using the Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic. 
31 
Table 1 
Data description (cont.) 
Panel B 
Responses to financial distress 
for a sample of 930 Spanish financially distressed firms 
The dummy TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION takes the value of 1 if the ratio of the book value of total debt 
to the book value of total assets falls from t = 0 to t = 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The dummy variable BANK 
DEBT REDUCTION takes the value of 1 if the book value of bank debt decreases from t = 0 to t = 1, and 
it is 0 otherwise. The dummy variable BANK DEBT EXTENSION is equal to 1 when the firm's bank 
debt maturity is extended. The dummy variable ASSET SALES is equal to 1 if the firm is reducing its 
gross fixed assets by 10 % or more from t = 0 to t = 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The dummy variable WAGE 
CONCESSIONS equals 1 if the ratio of labor costs to employment falls in the distress period and it is 0, 
otherwise. The dummy variable LAYOFFS takes a value of I ifthe firm cuts its labor force by 10 % or 
more, and 0 otherwise 
Response to financial distress 
Debt restructuring 
Total debt reduction 
Bank debt reduction 
Bank debt extension 
Operational actions 
Asset sales 
Wage concessions 
Layoffs 
Note: 
Number of occurrences 
298 
361 
98 
98 
437 
199 
Rate of occurrences (%)a 
32 
39 
11 
11 
47 
21 
a The rate of occurrence is the ratio between the number of occurrences of a certain response to financial 
distress and the number of observations in the sample (930). 
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Table 2 
Normalized sources of financial distress 
Following Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), normalized sources of financial distress are calculated 
dividing the cash flow change attributable to each factor (leverage, firm operating performance, industry 
operating performance) by the total cash flow change. The sample of 930 fmancially distressed firms has 
been set up using a database provided by the Bank of Spain. The definition of financial distress is based on 
an interest coverage ratio (EBITA/interest expenses). EBITA denotes earnings before interest, taxes and 
amortization. We exclude from the sample utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms 
that divested part of their lines of business, firms that changed their lines of business from one sector to 
another or firms with no interest expenses. All variables are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1 % 
tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in millions of Pesetas), and deflated using the 
1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Factor 
Leverage 
Firm operating performance 
Industry operating performance 
Number of observations 
Mean 
-0.0004 
0.9612 
0.0392 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.3208 
0.4124 
0.2089 
930 
Number of firms with 
primary cause 
42 
886 
2 
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Table 3 
Contingency analysis 
The sample has been set up using a database provided by the Bank of Spain. We exclude from the sample 
utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, 
firms that changed their lines of business from one sector to another or firms with no interest expenses. 
The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBITA/interest expenses). 
EBIT A denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. All variables are winsorized at both the 
upper and lower 1 % tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in millions of Pesetas), 
and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Panel A 
Layoffs and financial distress for a sample of 4,566 Spanish firms (1983-1994) 
Frequencies (%) No Financial Distress 
No Layoffs 85.97 
Layoffs 14.03 
N° 28,761 
Pearson C 
Notes: 
8 p-value is shown in parenthesis 
b Total number of observations 
Financial Distress Total sample 
78.60 85.74 
21.40 14.26 
930 29,691 
40.00 (0.00)" 
C Pearson's X2 for the hypothesis that layoffs and financial distress are statistically independent 
Panel B 
Layoffs and debt restructuring for a sample of 930 Spanish financially distressed 
firms 
No total Total debt Frecuencies (%) debt 
reduction 
reduction 
No Layoffs 81.01 73.49 
Layoffs 18.99 26.51 
N° 632 298 
Pearson C 6.81 (0.00)8 
Notes: 
a p-value is shown in parenthesis. 
b Total number of observations 
No bank bank debt No bank Bank debt debt 
reduction debt extension Total 
reduction extension 
82.28 75.90 79.21 73.47 78.60 
17.72 24.10 20.79 26.53 21.40 
429 361 832 98 930 
4.87 (0.02) 8 1.71 (0.19)8 
C Pearson's X2 for the hypothesis that layoffs and debt restructuring proxies are statistically independent. 
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Table 3 
Contingency analysis (cont.) 
Panel C 
Bank debt extension, total debt reduction and layoffs 
for a sample of 930 Spanish financially distressed firms 
LAYOFFS No total debt 
Frecuencies (%) reduction 
No bank debt extension 18.75 
Nb 560 
Bank debt extension 20.83 
Nb 72 
Pearson C 0.18 (0.67)3 
Notes: 
8 p-va1ue is shown in parenthesis 
b Total number of observations 
Total debt Pearson d 
reduction 
25.00 4.34 (0.03) 8 
272 
42.30 4.51 (0.03) 8 
26 
3.64 (0.05) 8 
C Pearson's X2 for the hypothesis that layoffs and bank debt extension are 
statistically independent. 
d Pearson's X2 for the hypothesis that layoffs and total debt reduction are 
statistically independent. 
Panel D 
Layoffs, asset sales, and wage concessions for a sample of 
930 Spanish financially distressed firms 
Frecuencies (%) No asset Asset 
sales sales 
No Layoffs 80.00 66.33 
Layoffs 20.00 33.67 
Nb 825 98 
Pearson C 9.71 (0.00) 8 
Notes: 
8 p-value is shown in parenthesis 
b Total number of observations 
No wage Wage Total 
concessions concessions 
67.75 90.85 78.60 
32.25 9.15 21.40 
493 437 930 
73.48 (0.00)8 
C Pearson' s X2 for the hypothesis that layoffs and asset sales and layoffs and wage 
concessions are statistically independent. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of layoffs: logit regressions for a sample of 930 Spanish 
financially distressed firms 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable (LAYOFFS) that takes the value of 1 if the firm cuts its labor force by 10% or 
more, and 0 otherwise. The sample of 930 financially distressed firms has been set up using a database provided by the Bank 
of Spain. The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBITA/interest expenses). EBITA 
denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We denote as t = 0 the pre-distress period. We exclude from the 
sample utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, firms that 
changed their lines of business from one sector to another or finns with no interest expenses. All variables are winsorized at 
both the upper and lower 1% tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in millions of Pesetas), and 
deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Main variables 
Total debt reduction 0.52'" 0.54'" 0.58'" 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.20) 
Bank debt reduction 0.39" 0.41" 0.42" 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Bank debt extension 0.58" 0.58" 0.61" 0.63" 0.70" 0.70" 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Asset sales 1.00'" 0.96'" 0.98'" 0.97'" 1.15'" 1.12'" 
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
Wage concessions 
-1.69'" -1.47'" -1.59'" -1.49'" -1.60'" -1.50'" 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Financial control variables (t = 0) 
Total debt/Total assets 0.57 0.69 0.12 0.22 
(0.45) (0.50) (0.49) (0.54) 
Interest Expenses/Total debt" 0.48'" 0.65'" 0.34' 0.50" 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) 
Real control variables (t = 0) 
Temporary workers/Employment 2.00'" 2.01'" 
(0.51) (0.55) 
Fixed net assets/Employment 
-0.01 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Log of total assets 
-0.21'" -0.17'" 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
-3.24' -3.03 
(1.90) (1.91) 
Sector and time control b 2.52' 2.49' 
(1.42) (1.48) 
Intercept 
-1.07'" -1.18'" -1.55'" -1.74'" -0.44 -0.88 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.29) (0.32) (0.56) (0.59) 
Number of observations 923 786 846 786 846 786 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test C 21.7 [0.01] 18.7 [0.04] 846.0 [0.42] 781.1 [0.47] 813.2 [0.69] 747.7 [0.74] 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
"Trade credit not included; b This variable, for each observation, is equal to the percentage of firms reducing employment by 10 
% or more in the same year and in the same sector (intermediate sample of 4566 firms). C p-value is shown in square brackets. 
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Table 5 
The quantitative impact of debt restructuring 
on the probability of layoffs 
The variable LAYOFFS takes the value of 1 if the firm cuts its labor force by 10% or more, and 0 
otherwise. The sample of 930 financially distressed firms has been set up using a database provided by the 
Bank of Spain. The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBIT A/interest 
expenses). EBITA denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We exclude from the sample 
utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, 
firms that changed their lines of business from one sector to another or firms with no interest expenses. All 
variables are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1 % tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish 
currency (in millions of Pesetas), and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Panel A 
The change in the odd ratio in response to debt restructuring 
The odd ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability of an employment reduction involving 10 % or more 
of the labor force (that is, Pr{LA YOFFS = I}) to its complement probability (Pr{LA YOFFS = O}). In this 
Panel, we present the change in the odd ratio associated with a shift from 0 to 1 in the value of each of the 
debt restructuring dummies. To calculate each odd ratio we use Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. 
Corresponding Columns in Table 4 used to compute the odd ratio 
Main variables 
Total debt reduction 
Bank debt reduction 
Bank debt extension 
(5) (6) 
Change in the odd ratio Change in the odd ratio 
1.78 
2.01 
Panel B 
1.52 
2.01 
The estimated probability of layoffs for the median firm 
in the sample of 930 Spanish financially distressed firms 
The median firm in the sample of 930 Spanish distressed firms does not sale assets, does not make wage 
concessions, and has the median value for all the control variables used in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 
4. 
No Total debt reduction & No Bank debt extension 
Total debt reduction & No Bank debt extension 
No Total debt reduction & Bank debt extension 
No Bank debt reduction & No Bank debt extension 
Bank debt reduction & No Bank debt extension 
No Bank debt reduction & Bank debt extension 
Corresponding Columns in Table 4 used 
to compute estimated probability of layoffs 
(5) (6) 
Estimated probability of Estimated probability of 
layoffs for the median layoffs for the median 
firm (%) firm (%) 
19.96 
30.79 
33.44 
18.76 
25.99 
31.71 
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Table 6 
Endogeneity problems (I): logit regressions for a sample of 930 Spanish 
financially distressed firms 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable (LAYOFFS) that takes the value of 1 if the firm cuts its labor force by 10% or 
more, and 0 otherwise. The sample of 930 fmancially distressed firms has been set up using a database provided by the Bank 
of Spain. The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBITA/interest expenses). EBIT A 
denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We denote as t = 0 the pre-distress period. We exclude from the 
sample utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, firms that 
changed their lines of business from one sector to another or firms with no interest expenses. All variables are winsorized at 
both the upper and lower 1% tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in millions of Pesetas), and 
deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Main variables 
Total debt reduction 0.49'" 0.53'" 0.51'" 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) 
Bank debt reduction 0.38" 0.41" 0.41" 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Bank debt extension 0.35 0.38 0.41' 0.44' 0.52" 0.53** 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) 
Asset sales 0.68'" 0.63" 0.63" 0.63** 0.81'" 0.80'" 
(0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
Labor costs/ Employment 
-0.30'" -0.35'" -0.38'" -0.33**' -0.28" -0.25** 
(0.10) (0.11 ) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Financial control variables (t = 0) 
Total debt/Total assets 0.26 0.41 -0.09 0.03 
(0.43) (0.47) (0.46) (0.50) 
Interest Expenses/Total debt a 0.46'" 0.60'" 0.38" 0.51** 
(0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) 
Real control variables (t = 0) 
Temporary workers/Employment 2.06'" 1.99**' 
(0.49) (0.51 ) 
Fixed net assets/Employment 
-0.01 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Log of total assets 
-0.13" -0.10' 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
-2.83' 
-2.69 
(1.76) (1.81 ) 
Sector and time control b 2.62" 2.53' 
(1.33) (1.40) 
Intercept 
-0.89'" -0.85'" -1.00'" -1.30'" -0.74 -1.11" 
(0.25) (0.29) (0.36) (0.40) (0.52) (0.55) 
Number or observations 923 786 846 786 846 786 
Hosmer-Lemeshow gOOdness-or-fit test c 869.3 [0.60] 748.3 [0.65] 839.2 [0.49] 775.6 [0.52] 833.6 [0.49] 763.2 [0.60] 
*** Significant at 1 %; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%; Robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
a Trade credit not included; b This variable, for each observation, is equal to the percentage of firms reducing employment by 10 % 
or more in the same year and in the same sector (intermediate sample of 4566 firms). C p-value is shown in square brackets. 
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Table 7 
Endogeneity problems (11) 
The variable LA YOFFS takes the value of 1 if the firm cuts its labor force by 10% or more, and 0 
otherwise. The sample of 930 financially distressed firms has been set up using a database provided by the 
Bank of Spain. The definition of financial distress is based on an interest coverage ratio (EBIT A/interest 
expenses). EBITA denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We exclude from the sample 
utilities, state-owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, 
firms that changed their lines of business from one sector to another or firms with no interest expenses. All 
variables are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1 % tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish 
currency (in millions of Pesetas), and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Panel A 
The estimated probability of layoffs conditional on a total debt reduction for a sub-
sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales 
and enjoying no bank debt extension. 
We estimate a bivariate logit for the joint probability of LA YOFFS and TOTAL DEBT REDUCTION for 
a sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales and enjoying no bank debt extension. This 
bivariate logit is estimated as a multinomial logit model (see Amemiya, 1985), using the same external 
controls as in Table 6. This estimation strategy allows us to calculate, for firms in this sub-sample, both 
the conditional probability of layoffs given that the firm experiences a total debt reduction, and the 
corresponding conditional probability when the firm's total debt is not reduced. 
Total debt reduction 
NO Total debt reduction 
Number of observations 
Test of Means b 
Notes: 
a Sample mean (%) 
Probability of layoffs conditional on: a 
25.84 
16.60 
667 
30.73 (0.00) 
b t-test for significant differences of the probability of layoffs given that the firm experiences a total debt 
reduction and the probability oflayoffs given that the firm's total debt is not reduced. p-value is shown in 
parenthesis. 
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Table 7 
Endogeneity problems (11) (cont.) 
Panel B 
The estimated probability of layoffs conditional on a bank debt reduction for a 
sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales 
and enjoying no bank debt extension. 
We estimate a bivariate logit for the joint probability of LAYOFFS and BANK DEBT REDUCTION for 
a sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales and enjoying no bank debt extension. This 
bivariate logit is estimated as a multinomiallogit model (see Amemiya, 1985), using the same external 
controls as in Table 6. This estimation strategy allows us to calculate, for firms in this sub-sample, both 
the conditional probability of layoffs given that the firm experiences a bank debt reduction, and the 
corresponding conditional probability when the firm's bank debt is not reduced. 
Bank debt reduction 
NO Bank debt reduction 
Number of observations 
Test of Means b 
Notes: 
a Sample mean (%) 
Probability of layoffs conditional on: a 
23.19 
15.78 
667 
10.99 (0.00) 
b t-test for significant differences of the probability of layoffs given that the firm experiences a bank debt 
reduction and the probability of layoffs given that the firm's bank debt is not reduced. p-value is shown in 
parenthesis. 
Panel C 
The estimated probability of layoffs conditional on a bank debt extension for a 
sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales 
and enjoying no debt reductions. 
We estimate a bivariate logit for the joint probability of LAYOFFS and BANK DEBT EXTENSION for a 
sub-sample of financially distressed firms with no asset sales and enjoying no debt reductions. This 
bivariate logit is estimated as a multinomial logit model (see Amemiya, 1985), using the same external 
controls as in Table 6. This estimation strategy allows us to calculate, for firms in this sub-sample, both 
the conditional probability of layoffs given that the firm experiences a bank debt extension, and the 
corresponding conditional probability when the firm's bank debt is not extended. 
Bank debt extension 
NO Bank debt extension 
Number of observations 
Test of Means b 
Notes: 
a Sample mean (%) 
Probability of layoffs conditional on: a 
16.45 
13.00 
325 
3.91 (0.00) 
b t-test for significant differences of the probability oflayoffs given that the firm experiences a bank debt 
extension and the probability oflayoffs given that the firm's bank debt is not extended. p-value is shown 
in parenthesis. 
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Table 8 
The impact of layoffs on operating performance 
This sample has been set up using a database provided by the Bank of Spain. We exclude from the sample utilities, state-
owned firms, firms that were taken over, firms that divested part of their lines of business, firms that changed their lines of 
business from one sector to another or firms with no interest expenses. The definition of financial distress is based on an 
interest coverage ratio (EBITNinterest expenses). EBITA denotes earnings before interest, taxes and amortization. We 
denote as t = 0 the pre-distress period; t = 1 is the period of financial distress; t = 2 denotes the post-distress period. All 
variables are winsorized at both the upper and lower 1% tails. All nominal variables are denoted in Spanish currency (in 
miIIions of Pesetas), and deflated using the 1986 Spanish GDP Price Index. 
Panel A 
No Layoffs & Layoffs & Layoffs & Layoffs Total debt Bank debt layoffs 
reduction Bank debt reduction extension 
Change (%) Mean Mean p-value b Mean p-valueb Mean p-value b Mean p-value b from t = I to t = 2 in: 
Return on assets (ROA) a 43.82'" 39.66'" 0.84 23.70 0.56 60.52'" 0.41 53.88' 0.76 
EBIT NInterest expenses a 67.l8'" 83.61'" 0.43 116.l8'" 0.25 119.50'" 0.08 67.43" 0.99 
EBIT NTotal assets a 44.42'" 56.92'" 0.38 41.68"- 0.83 79.95-'- 0.07 123.37* 0.27 
Notes: 
a We calculate this variable at t = 1 and t = 2 relative to the corresponding value for the median firm in its sector in that year 
(using the intermediate sample of 4,566 firms). Then, we use these calculations to evaluate the change in operating 
rerformance relative to sector and time. 
t-test for significant differences of the means of firms that do not adjust employment and firms that cut employment 
substantially and/or restructure financially. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; *Significant at lO%; 
Panel B 
Layoffs & Layoffs & Layoffs & No layoffs Layoffs Total debt Bank debt reduction Bank debt 
reduction extension 
Change (%) Mean Mean p-valueb Mean p-value b Mean p-value b Mean p-value b from t = 1 to t = 3 in: 
Return on assets (ROA) a 50.37*-- 45.67 0.90 15.77 0.70 94.95'" 0.04 35.69 0.73 
EBIT NInterest expenses a lO3.75'" 152.92"- 0.28 263.14" 0.07 164.22"- 0.08 359.37 0.41 
EBIT NTotal assets a 76.72'-- 93.65-" 0.53 55.38"- 0.22 lO9.58" 0.48 233.34 0.35 
Notes: 
a We calculate this variable at t = 1 and t = 3 relative to the corresponding value for the median firm in its sector in that year 
(using the intermediate sample of 4,566 firms). Then, we use these calculations to evaluate the change in operating 
rerformance relative to sector and time. 
t-test for significant differences of the means of firms that do not adjust employment and firms that cut employment 
substantially and/or restructure financially. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; *Significant at lO%; 
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